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that of the innocent inscription on the little Rhodian vase of the Metropolitan Museum ΚΑΛΛΙΣΤΑ ΤΑΣ ΗΑΡΡΑΣΙΑ ΗΩΣ ΕΜΙΝ ΔΟΚΕΙ.

This brief notice is not a review, still less a critical censure, but only an announcement of Dr. Roberts' attractive little volume. The original lecture, based on a comparison of Henry V and the *Persae*, has been expanded by supplementary notes into a discursive and extremely readable repertory of Greek and modern utterances, not only on the main theme of patriotism, but on the ideas and ideals of national unity, religion, peace, progress, humanity, and the love of the mother land. It will admirably serve its purpose as a compendium of references on these topics and of suggestions and stimulus for further reading. It appeals both to the classicist and the general reader.

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Roman Imperialism. By TENNEY FRANK. New York: Macmillan, 1914. Pp. xiii+365. \$2.50.

In the first sentence of his Preface the author says: "My purpose in the following pages has been to analyze, so far as the fragmentary sources permit, the precise influences that urged the Roman republic toward territorial expansion"; and his conception of the character of these influences is made clear in passages like these: "Thus the long history of Roman expansion, which had from the beginning rested upon defensive rather than aggressive tactics, ended in a policy of seclusion and self-defense" (p. 356); "Up to his [Pompey's] day, expansion that was in any sense intentional had been merely sporadic and unsupported by any definite policy" (p. 324); "If therefore we hope to understand the groping, stumbling, accidental expansion of Rome, we must rid ourselves of anachronistic generalizations and remote causes and look instead for the specific accidents that led the nation unwittingly from one contest to another until to her own surprise Rome was mistress of the Mediterranean" (p. 120). In other words, the author's purpose is to combat the ordinary view that Rome reached out after territory and sovereignty, partly for political reasons and partly because of the pressure of economic forces. His starting-point is his conception of *ius fetiale*, imbedded in *mos maiorum*, and its function in early Roman history (cf. Professor Frank in this journal, 1912, pp. 335 ff.), according to which "war was considered justifiable only on the score of an unjust act" (p. 8), and "Roman *mos maiorum* did not recognize the right of aggression or a desire for more territory as just causes of war" (p. 9). He also says "That the institution was observed in good faith for centuries there can be little doubt" (p. 9), and he carries his belief in its validity so far as to write: "There seems to be no foundation for the frequently repeated generalization that in ancient times the normal international status was that of hostility" (p. 12). With this principle

as a guide, the author's method is to examine carefully each successive step in Rome's territorial expansion and determine if possible the influences that brought about action.

One weakness in this method is suggested in the opening sentence of the Preface, quoted above, namely, the difficulty of disengaging "precise influences" from "fragmentary sources." To discover the motives of national action would not be easy even if the sources were complete and not colored by the prejudices and predilections which belong to all Roman historians. To the probable errors that are due to the character of these sources must be added the possibility of a mistaken conception of the scope and binding force of *ius fetiale*, and therefore we must emphasize the necessity of caution in accepting the results of such a method. Rightly or wrongly, the reviewer has not yet been convinced by Professor Frank's arguments that *ius fetiale* determined so completely the action of the Romans that "the first instance, so far as we know, of Rome's departure from the intents and purposes of the fetial institution" did not occur until 282 B.C. (p. 65).

In his treatment of successive periods and individual occurrences the author exhibits learning, clarity of statement, and enthusiasm for his task, and to his conclusions in each case the reader will give as much weight as they seem to deserve after allowance has been made for the frequent insufficiency of data and the attitude of the interpreter. Great credit is due to Professor Frank for making it very clear that there is no evidence whatever for some of those views that have been accepted without question. The book itself is controversial, and it is of course impossible to enter into the discussion of disputed points within the limits of a review. The reviewer hopes that he will not be thought hypercritical in drawing attention to a certain amount of inconsistency that appears from time to time if the author's words are to be taken in their natural and ordinary sense. He writes: "The importance of the circumstance [i.e., the acquisition of Veian territory] for the question of Roman imperialism lies in the fact that in the future it was usually the democratic element that favored a policy of expansion" (p. 21), and "shortly after 367 . . . a policy of expansion set in, a policy doubtless to be explained by the new democratic influences at work in Rome" (p. 24). If it is right to speak of a policy of expansion as a part of the democratic movement in the fourth century B.C., it is hardly just to say later, "Up to his [Pompey's] day expansion that was in any sense intentional had been merely sporadic and unsupported by any definite policy" (p. 324), unless unusual and unexpected emphasis is to be laid on "definite." So, too, in connection with the alliance between Rome and Capua in 343 we read: "What could have induced the Romans to form entangling alliances so far afield it is difficult to comprehend" (p. 31), but not if the germ of an expansionist policy had penetrated even a little way into the democratic consciousness. The result of the dissolution of the Latin League was "the political reorganization of the defeated allies by some farsighted statesman,

who, for the first time in history, showed how a republican city-state might build a world-empire, and thus shaped a policy that endured for centuries" (p. 33). Now if any farsighted statesman in 338 had visions of a world-empire he must have entertained imperialistic ideas of some sort, and not indeed alone, for he must have counted on a certain amount of political sympathy. It is much more probable that the development of the relationship between Rome and the Latin cities was the result of moving along the line of least resistance, and of an endeavor to achieve certain essential objects quickly and naturally, or, as the author himself says, "the free Roman people stumbled on falteringly and unwittingly into ever-increasing dominion" (p. 358). Again, Professor Frank says, "In the year 242 then Rome secured her first subject province and set out on the devious road of imperialism" (p. 93), a passage that seems to contradict those quoted above from pp. 21, 24 about a democratic policy of expansion, and that from p. 324 to the effect that there was no such thing before Pompey.

With some of the author's interpretations of conditions issue may fairly be taken, e.g., "The fact that in 383-382 two Latin colonies, Sutrium and Nepes, were planted north of Rome's newly acquired Veian lands seems to prove that Rome at that time was willing to let herself be completely surrounded by Latin communities, that in other words she had no idea of ever extending her own territory farther" (p. 24), and "But it can be laid down as a general rule that Rome studiously kept 'hands off' beyond the Tiber after the fall of Veii" (p. 53). Apparently the reader is to believe that Rome took but a languid interest in the founding of Sutrium and Nepes, and that their existence was on the whole a hindrance to her own expansion. But surely by 383 there could have been no illusions in Rome as to her own real position in the Latin League and the true meaning and object of these two powerful colonies in the heart of southern Etruria.

Exception must certainly be taken to the statement that there were in Rome in 290 "no statues and no paintings except for the few treasures brought as booty from Etruscan cities" (p. 59), and a few pages farther on (p. 64) there is introduced as evidence "a statue at Rome erected by Thurians in honor of the plebeian tribune, Aelius, who had secured the passage of the plebiscite which relieved Thurii of siege." This is supposed to have occurred in 285, and our only authority is Pliny (xxxiv. 32: "*publice autem ab exteris posita est Romae C. Aelio tribuno plebis, lege per lata in Sthennium Statilium Lucanum qui Thurinos bis infestaverat; ob id Aelium Thurini statua et corona aurea donarunt*"). Of this Professor Frank says: "Pliny often employs worthless sources, but in this case his source drew its information from the inscription on a statue which remained in full view in the Roman Forum" (p. 82). It is not certain that the statue was in the Forum, and if Pliny is to be believed here, why reject similar testimony in the passage immediately preceding about other much older statues? The existence of this statue of Aelius has been used by other historians (e.g.,

Pais) as evidence for the theory that the senate rejected the treaty with Thurii, and that the plebs "having just attained full legislative rights in 287 took matters into its own hands and voted for the alliance." Now this may be true, but it is equally possible, so far as our information goes, and in some ways more probable, that while the majority of the senate opposed the alliance, an ambitious and imperialistic minority secured the action they desired through the agency of the tribune Aelius.

On p. 130 is outlined what the author believes to have been the plan devised by the state to provide for the speedy development of waste territory in Southern Italy after the war with Hannibal. This involved the making of large leaseholds for cattle and sheep ranches, with slave labor if free labor were not available. "The scheme was adopted and the terms made attractive. Leaseholds of five hundred acres—or even of a thousand acres if the contractor had two children—were offered, in order that all the land might soon be made productive." In a note (43, p. 136) he says: "This is of course the famous law which the annalists erroneously credited to the Licinus and Sextius of 366 B.C.," and he repeats his own interpretation of it. In view of the great uncertainty and divergence of opinion about the Licinian legislation, it is not well to use a hypothetical explanation in the running text as the basis of a second elaborate hypothesis, in language that implies absolute certainty, and to give no hint of the real situation except in a note at the end of the chapter.

In the discussion of the circumstances under which war was declared on Philip of Macedon in 200, two objections to such action are emphasized: one the disinclination of the Roman people to undertake a new war, and the second the illegality of so doing, "for the people were not in a mood to invite the wrath of heaven by breaking the sacred injunctions of the *ius fetiale*" (p. 145). After describing, according to Livy, the consultation in the senate and the two references of the matter to the *comitia*, the author continues: "Doubtless the senators who were experienced in diplomacy wished to break away from the old restrictions. But the fact remained that for a thousand years the Romans had acted on the belief that an infraction of the *ius fetiale* would bring a curse upon the state. Nevertheless, the Macedonian problem was referred to the fetial priests, and they were apparently influenced by the new school. They decided to disregard the vital distinction between *societas* and *amicitia*, and to extend for the present occasion the provisions of the *ius fetiale* over the *amici*" (p. 147); and in the note on this last sentence (19, p. 160), "We draw this inference from the fact that the phrase *socius et amicus* displaces the legal term *amicus*." The reader gathers from this presentation of the case that the decision of the fetials was vital, and that something is said in the sources about the motives that influenced them to take this momentous step. What Livy actually says is that, after the whole matter had been settled definitely and all proper solemnities observed, "consultique fetiales ab consule Sulpicio bellum quod indiceretur regi Philippo

utrum ipsi utique nuntiari iuberent, an satis esset in finibus regni quod proximum praesidium esset eo nuntiari, fetiales decreverunt utrum eorum fecisset recte facturum" (xxxi. 8). There is no indication that they were consulted about anything but the method of declaration, and no hint of any agitation in their breasts about the possible consequences.

The interpretation of Rome's action at the beginning of the first Punic war seems open to some criticism. After describing the previous conduct of the Mamertines in Messana, Professor Frank writes: "In 268 he [Hiero] gained a decisive victory over the Mamertines and was on the point of investing Messana when the Carthaginians . . . ordered him to desist. The Carthaginians then placed a garrison in the city on the pretext that they wished to protect its independence from the encroachments of Hiero; but the Mamertines very evidently did not desire that kind of independence, and they secretly voted to induce the garrison to leave and to ask the Romans for a protecting guard. The garrison was accordingly disposed of, and an appeal was sent to Rome for an alliance and a detachment of troops" (p. 88). We may pass over the unqualified assertion that the battle of the Longanus was fought in 268, although the date of this battle is hotly disputed and the sources are anything but definite, but there is a very distinct intimation that the garrison was disposed of first and that then overtures were made to Rome. This intimation is made still more definite by a remark on the next page: "Furthermore, when the Mamertines asked for aid, they were, so far as we know, autonomous, and Rome therefore would not have to break the old fetial rules in granting their request." On this statement there is a note (3, p. 107): "Both Polybius and Diodorus are obscure on this point. The only established fact is that there was no Punic garrison in Messana when the Romans arrived." Now it is not possible to extract from the sources any justification for the position that no communication was had with Rome until the Carthaginian garrison had left the city, and the impression made by Polybius' narrative is not at all in accord with this interpretation. If Dio's account of Gaius Claudius' exploits contains any truth—a matter very far from having been decided—the Carthaginian garrison was in the citadel when the Romans arrived. This is an essential point, for if, while having a Carthaginian garrison under treaty relations with Carthage, the Mamertines entered into communication with Rome, the latter would certainly be acting contrary to what Professor Frank believes was her guiding principle in allowing any suggestions to be made against the interests of her ally, Carthage.

Supposing, however, that the garrison was out and Messana could be called autonomous, how about the further analysis of the situation? "From the point of view of international practices and of previously existing treaties no serious objection could be raised. Since Rome was sovereign at Rhegium on the coast of Italy, less than two miles from Messana, her interests were as much involved in the place as those of either Carthage or Syracuse.

There were no treaties which forbade Rome to hold alliances in Sicily" (p. 88). This last statement is correct, for Polybius says so, but if our author's generally expressed belief in Rome's attitude is true, the idea that she was as much interested in Messana as Syracuse or Carthage can hardly be so. Polybius states distinctly (i. 7) that Rhegium had been given back unconditionally to the Rhegines in 270. Furthermore, how can it be said that in view of the relations existing between Rome, Carthage, Syracuse, and Messana a Roman alliance and garrison in Messana would be regarded as a friendly act by the other powers? It must be remembered that it was not a question merely of an alliance, but of armed protection against Carthage, a friend of Rome.

On p. 89 we read: "On the score of respectability there could be no serious objection to an alliance with the Mamertines," and in a note (3, p. 107), "Polybius apparently thinks it was unseemly for Rome to ally herself with a state founded by freebooters (iii. 26). In this he is only repeating one of the arguments of the aristocratic opposition to the war as he found it in Fabius (i. 10). I doubt not that some senators opposed the war on this ground, and the senatorial writers like Fabius could well afford to make much of an argument so specious when later explaining their opposition." Professor Frank seems to have overlooked what Diodorus (xxiii), quoting from an anti-Roman source, puts into the mouth of Hiero in his answer to the demands of Appius that Hiero and the Carthaginians raise the siege of Messana. "Hiero replied that the Mamertines were justly besieged, for they had caused rebellions in Gela and Camerina, and had seized Messana treacherously. Moreover, the Romans ought not, while chattering about keeping their promise (*πίστις*), to protect murderers, especially murderers who had themselves broken their promises. If the Romans should undertake a war in behalf of these wretches, it would be evident to all men that they were making pity for those in danger an excuse for their own advantage, and that they were really aiming at the acquisition of Sicily."

There are a few infelicitous locutions which the reviewer hopes will be changed in the second edition: "dangered" (p. 39), "Repulsion of the barbarians" (p. 62), "Schulten's exemplary article" (p. 241), "petulant reign" (p. 243), "tributary ones" (p. 244), "speeches conserved by Gellius" (p. 248), "most invaluable" (p. 258), "stolid Roman legions" (p. 264), "cumbersome army" (p. 265), "evidence implies" (p. 58). Now and then a sentence shows haste or lack of revision, as, "The contract system of revenue collecting was a natural system in the ancient city-state of conducting any public business" (p. 248), "no ulterior motive can be proved against Gracchus" (p. 249), "inability to withhold covetous eyes from 'the longing backward glance'" (p. 55). Twice the author uses Iber for Ebro (p. 124); he lends the weight of his authority to that dreadful English usage "Rostrum" (p. 55); and once (p. 273) he startles us with "Ptolemy the Corpulent"!

Professor Frank is to be heartily congratulated on having written a very useful and interesting book, one that no student of Roman history can afford to neglect or fail to read with profit. If any chapters were to be selected for special commendation they would be viii-x, which deal with Philip and Antiochus, and chap xiv, on "Commercialism and Expansion."

S. B. P.

The Communings with Himself of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Emperor of Rome, Together with His Speeches and Sayings. A revised text and a translation into English by C. R. HAINES. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam, 1916. (Loeb Classical Library.) Pp. xxxi+414.

Mr. Haines has justified the bold enterprise of adding still another to the eight English versions of Marcus Aurelius described in his introduction. He is clearly a competent Grecian and he knows and loves his author, whom he defends with what, but for Mr. Bussell, I might deem superfluous zeal against the charges of pharisaism, love of fame, and persecution of the Christians. He cannot, of course, reproduce all the peculiarities of Marcus Aurelius' Greek, the abuse of adverbs and abstract neuters, and the technicalities of Stoicism. But he does render admirably the touches of wistful pathos, romantic sentiment, cosmic emotion, and high meditative melancholy that differentiate the imperial Stoic from the halting slave of Nicopolis, whose substantive teaching is hardly distinguishable from his.

Apart from the charm of its style, the little volume will serve the convenience of students by its sufficient bibliography, its excellent index, its pertinent footnotes on the text, the citations of parallel passages, and appendixes on the speeches and sayings of Marcus Aurelius, which collect the testimony of antiquity. I have observed only a few apparent inaccuracies. In iv. 24 *πράξεις παρέλκουνσαι* is not "distracting actions," but superfluous actions. In iv. 30 *τροφὰς τὰς ἐκ τῶν μαθημάτων* does not mean "I get no living out of my learning." It is metaphorical, and, as the context shows, is an expression of the busy emperor's complaint that he has no time to read and study. In v. 15 *ὁ ἐλαττωτικὸς ἑαυτοῦ* is not a "man who came short of his own standard," but one who forbears his own advantage, takes less than he might. In viii. 2 *μικρὸν καὶ τέθηκα καὶ πάντ' ἐκ μέσου*, the rendering "And all that lies between is past" conveys, I think, a wrong suggestion. The phrase *καὶ πάντ' ἐκ μέσου*, I think, is colloquial and means "And all is gone." In ix. 3 *ὥστικῶς* does not, I think, signify reluctance toward death, but the opposite fault of pushing and thrusting on to meet it. In Philostratus *Vit. Soph.* ii. 1, quoted on p. 366, the translator has missed the meaning of a technicality of Greek rhetoric. Philostratus relates that Herodes did not "schematize" his wrath against the emperor, as was to be expected of a man exercised in that form of rhetorical art, but assailed him openly: *παρελθὼν γὰρ καθίστατο ἐς*